지원사업
학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
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연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
초록· 키워드
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Most legal scholars believe that legal ethics theory is essentially a branch of moral philosophy. Even proponents of a strongly client-centered view of legal ethics argue from moral values such as the autonomy of clients. In order to formulate the proper relationship between legal ethics and 'real' ethics, we need to recognize that lawyers are quasi-political actors, and importantly, different from citizens in their relationship to state power. Because of this nature of lawyer and legal practice, the author argues that legal theory is the concern of political philosophy. It is thus essential to understand the function of law and the reasons why legal directives possess legal authority over citizens. Law exists in order to provide a framework for coordinated social action in the face of persistent moral disagreement. The authority of law depends on its capacity to enable collective social action despite ethical pluralism. Framed in terms of the well-known metaphor of a "chain novel," Ronald Dworkin argues that the decisions of individual judges must fit within this narrative, thereby exhibiting the virtue of integrity, the sine qua non of legitimacy. Most lawyers are not literally officials in the same way that judges and executive officials are, but they nevertheless act in the name of society by providing a mechanism through which normative disagreements are channeled into an authoritative process of resolution. The key fact that makes legal ethics different from morality or real ethics is this quasi-official nature of lawyers and their loyalty to the system of law.
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