본 연구는 2003년부터 2010년까지의 기간동안 기업의 특수관계자 거래가 자본시장에 미치는 영향에 대해 타인자본비용을 통해 검증하였다. 타인자본비용의 측정치로는 재무제표를 이용하여 측정된 부채이자비용과 신용평가기관이 제공하는 신용등급을 사용하였으며, 신용등급 분석의 경우 회귀분석과 순위로짓분석을 각각 실시하였다.
분석결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 특수관계자 거래는 타인자본비용에 유의적인 양(+)의 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 이러한 결과는 특수관계자 거래가 많을수록 경영자와 외부이해관계자 사이에 정보비대칭이 증가할 수 있기 때문에 상대적으로 높은 위험 프리미엄이 반영되어 타인자본비용이 증가한 것으로 해석할 수 있다. 둘째, 외국인투자자 비율이 높은 기업의 경우 특수관계자 거래가 커질수록 타인자본비용은 증가하는 것으로 나타났다. 셋째, 감사인규모가 큰 기업의 경우 특수관계자 거래가 증가할수록 타인자본비용은 커지는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 외국인투자자와 대형회계법인의 경우, 경영자의 자의성을 감소시키지 못할 수 있기 때문에 특수관계자 거래가 증가할수록 자본시장에서는 이를 보다 부정적인 평가를 하는 것으로 살펴볼 수 있다.
본 연구의 결과는 특수관계자 거래를 빈번하게 행하고 있는 기업에 대한 하나의 유용한 투자정보로서 활용될 수 있을 것이며, 기업 입장에서는 특수관계자 거래에 대한 정보비대칭을 감소시키려는 노력이 필요함을 제시하고 있다.
This study examines the effect of related party transaction on the cost of debt. Related party transactions are expected to have high risk premium resulting in high cost of debt. Cost of debt is defined as borrowing rates calculated by using financial statements and credit ratings provided by the credit rating agency. In addition, this study investigates the effect of the firm's monitoring system such as foreign investors, big audit firms on the relationship between related party transaction and cost of debt. If foreign investor and big audit firms efficiently play a role in monitoring, they will monitor(reduce) related party transaction. Related party transactions are easy to adjust business condition because of discrepancy of influence caused by a related party. So, related party transactions will be used as a way of earnings management. Therefore regulators request firms to disclose related party transactions on financial statement footnotes. In fact, it has not been recorded in detail. According to the prior studies, related party transactions would worse earnings quality because related party transactions are used as a way of earnings management(Kim and Woo 2008, 2009). Furthermore, Managers pursue private profits through related party transactions. In case of highly related party transactions, auditor spends more time and effort in audit procedure to reduce audit risk(Woo and Lee 2010). That is, the more related party transactions are, the information asymmetry(information risk) is greater. Companies with low disclosure quality shown to increase cost of debt.
The sample is composed of firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange from 2003 to 2010. The sample is composed of non-financial firms that satisfy all of the following criteria are selected: (1) fiscal-year ending December 31, (2) availability of related party transaction from TS2000 Database, (3) availability of financial statement KIS-Value database. Also, we use credit rating as a proxy for cost of debt. For additional analysis, this study obtain data on credit rating by searching through KIS-Value database. This study draw these credit ratings such that the best rating corresponds with 1 and the worst rating with 10 to conduct our empirical analysis. Finally, 3,698 firm-year observations are used in the empirical analysis. To test hypothesis of the effect of related party transaction on the cost of debt, this study carry out ordinary least squares(OLS) regressions and ordered logit(OL) regression analysis. The empirical findings are summarized as follows. First, the related party transaction positively influences the cost of debt(or credit rating). This result means that related party transaction increase the cost of debt by enlarging information asymmetry between managers and investors. Thus, investors may require higher risk premium on the firms with many transactions to the related-party. Second, foreign investors positively affect the relationship between related party transaction and the cost of debt. Consistent with prior studies(Paek and Cho 2006; Kim and Woo 2008), this result suggests that foreign investors are not concerned about earnings management. Third, the size of audit firms is positively related to the relationship between related party transaction and the cost of debt. This result means that big audit firms are considered as less concerned about arbitrary earnings management, related party transactions are negatively evaluated by investors.
In addition, we separate the sample 3,698 firm-year into tunneling(N=1,732) and propping(N=1,966). It is measured by the difference related party transaction(purchases+other losses) and related party transactions(sales+other gains). If the difference is greater(lower) than 0, it is tunneling(propping). In case of tunneling group, the related party transaction positively influences the cost of debt. This result indicates that related party transaction increase cost of debt by increasing risk premium(information uncertainty) between managers and investors because managers tends to gain private profits through tunneling activities. Meanwhile, in case of propping group, the related party transaction don't affect the cost of debt.
This study additional test according to the type of related party transactions. Also, this study examines the effect of related party capital transaction(such as trade receivables, loans, trade payables, borrowings) on the cost of debt. The related party capital transaction positively influences the cost of debt. It means that investors may require higher risk premium on the firms with many capital transactions to the related-party. The findings of this study provide the insightful information to decide investment on the firms with related party transactions. Firms with related party transaction need to increase the effort to reduce information asymmetry.