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Later in 2006, sudden doubts arose not only about the importance of new fiduciary duty, but about whether the duty even existed. In Stone v. Ritter, the Delaware Supreme Court again examined the contours of the fiduciary duty of good faith and announced that it was not a separate duty, but rather part of the traditional duty of loyalty, and that its breach did not alone state a cause of action. Two years later, in Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan, the Delaware Supreme Court seemed to reduce the duty even further. The current absence of agreement among scholars about the scope and relative importance of the doctrine of good faith makes the topic ripe for discussion from varied perspectives, and that is the reason for this symposium.
One group of judges and scholars suggested that the importance of focusing on the duty of good faith may be greatly exaggerated. Other scholars, and indeed some of the same scholars when in a different mood, are more optimistic that the doctrine of good faith may still contain substance, and could be important in explaining what senior corporate managers must do: most importantly, that directors’ motives in approving transactions can be scrutinized and that directors must obey positive law, regardless of the possibility of opportunistically making profits.
Proponents of managerial accountability in corporate governance look for meaning in the doctrine of good faith because the traditional fiduciary duties of care and loyalty in reality do little to discipline boards. Prior to 1985, corporate directors were virtually never found liable for violating the duty of care unless accompanied by allegations of self-dealing (i.e., duty of loyalty violations). After the stunning decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom in 1985, which held directors liable for monetary damages because they had been grossly negligent in violation of their duty of care, the Delaware legislature promptly overruled the judiciary. Delaware adopted a provision that would allow corporations to adopt charter provisions to exculpate directors for duty of care violations. Most corporations adopted these amendments, and most other state legislatures followed Delaware.
Just as exculpation for gross negligence made the duty of care protections trivial, Delaware courts also tended to define self-dealing so narrowly that the duty of loyalty provided minimal protection to corporations and their constituents. Even with self-dealing, it was generally easy to have non-interested directors sanitize otherwise tainted transactions, leaving corporate directors with little meaningful accountability. Given the weakness of traditional remedies, the duty of good faith, whether as one of a triad of fiduciary duties or as part of a more robust duty of loyalty, can be of great importance. As Disney made clear, the duty of good faith cannot be satisfied if directors: act in subjective bad faith; consciously disregard their duties; are motivated by an actual intent to harm the corporation; or cause the corporation to violate positive law. I think this new focus on the motives of directors and the express fiduciary duty to avoid knowing violations of law could be crucial for corporate governance because neither violation is subject to the protections of the business judgment rule or charter exculpation provisions.
One group of judges and scholars suggested that the importance of focusing on the duty of good faith may be greatly exaggerated. Other scholars, and indeed some of the same scholars when in a different mood, are more optimistic that the doctrine of good faith may still contain substance, and could be important in explaining what senior corporate managers must do: most importantly, that directors’ motives in approving transactions can be scrutinized and that directors must obey positive law, regardless of the possibility of opportunistically making profits.
Proponents of managerial accountability in corporate governance look for meaning in the doctrine of good faith because the traditional fiduciary duties of care and loyalty in reality do little to discipline boards. Prior to 1985, corporate directors were virtually never found liable for violating the duty of care unless accompanied by allegations of self-dealing (i.e., duty of loyalty violations). After the stunning decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom in 1985, which held directors liable for monetary damages because they had been grossly negligent in violation of their duty of care, the Delaware legislature promptly overruled the judiciary. Delaware adopted a provision that would allow corporations to adopt charter provisions to exculpate directors for duty of care violations. Most corporations adopted these amendments, and most other state legislatures followed Delaware.
Just as exculpation for gross negligence made the duty of care protections trivial, Delaware courts also tended to define self-dealing so narrowly that the duty of loyalty provided minimal protection to corporations and their constituents. Even with self-dealing, it was generally easy to have non-interested directors sanitize otherwise tainted transactions, leaving corporate directors with little meaningful accountability. Given the weakness of traditional remedies, the duty of good faith, whether as one of a triad of fiduciary duties or as part of a more robust duty of loyalty, can be of great importance. As Disney made clear, the duty of good faith cannot be satisfied if directors: act in subjective bad faith; consciously disregard their duties; are motivated by an actual intent to harm the corporation; or cause the corporation to violate positive law. I think this new focus on the motives of directors and the express fiduciary duty to avoid knowing violations of law could be crucial for corporate governance because neither violation is subject to the protections of the business judgment rule or charter exculpation provisions.
목차
Ⅰ. 서설
Ⅱ. 신인의무
Ⅲ. 성실의무
Ⅳ. 결어
참고문헌
Abstract
참고문헌 (25)
참고문헌 신청
1. [단행본] - カーティス J ミルハウプト / 2009 / 米國會社法 / 有斐閣
2. [단행본] - 田中英夫ほか / 1991 / 英米法辭典 / 東京大學出版會
3. [학술지(정기간행물)] - Andrews S. Gold / 2009 / The New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate Law / U.C. Davis L. Rev 43 (457)
4. [단행본] - Arthur R. Pinto / 2004 / Understanding Corporate Law / LexisNexis
5. [학술지(정기간행물)] - Bayless Manning / 1985 / Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom after Van Gorkom / Bus. Law 41 (1)
2. [단행본] - 田中英夫ほか / 1991 / 英米法辭典 / 東京大學出版會
3. [학술지(정기간행물)] - Andrews S. Gold / 2009 / The New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate Law / U.C. Davis L. Rev 43 (457)
4. [단행본] - Arthur R. Pinto / 2004 / Understanding Corporate Law / LexisNexis
5. [학술지(정기간행물)] - Bayless Manning / 1985 / Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom after Van Gorkom / Bus. Law 41 (1)
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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2016-360-001320578