지원사업
학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
커뮤니티
연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
논문 기본 정보
- 자료유형
- 학술대회자료
- 저자정보
- 발행연도
- 2013.5
- 수록면
- 373 - 383 (11page)
이용수
초록· 키워드
오류제보하기
In many cases, a construction firm’s profit depends on handling costs for unwanted byproducts, created from performing a construction project. A firm can get closer to an executive office with shrewd ideas that a responsibility of treating harmful wastes can be waived. This lobby even can lift a probability of participating in any public procurement project. When a firm attempts to hang around an executive office to gain excessive profits, a cost is required. There is a tradeoff between excessive profits and costs in lobbying an executive. Not surprisingly, rivalries would have similar ideas. As more firms act to gain excessive profits, a lobby has properties of simultaneous game. Furthermore, this simultaneous game should become dynamic if a firm’s profit is damaged for good when the lobby is detected. We will show that a firm is actually optimizing a level of involvement in lobby on the basis of expected discounted profits, obtainable during an entire life of firm. Accordingly, a Nash equilibrium level of spending on lobby and expected discounted profit are determined. In last, we provide some implication about a level of penalty for committed illegal lobbies and discuss how this penalty can prevent firms from attempting to illegally lobby an executive.
목차
1. Introduction
2. Model
3. Expected Discounted Total Profit
4. Lobby and Competition
5. Conclusion
References
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